The Berichten No. 1–4 from Van Heutsz (23 May 1896) — preserved in the narrative of Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 on pages 189, 190, 190–191, and 192 — were four sequential operational messages sent by Lt.-Col. J. B. van Heutsz, commander of the Bergcolonne, to the overall commander Kolonel Stemfoort during the storming of Tjot Tjako on the morning of 23 May 1896, the first day of the three-day Dutch offensive against Teuku Umar’s stelling in the IV and VI Moekims. The four messages, transmitted at 6:40 a.m., 8:17 a.m., undated (mid-morning), and 9:15 a.m. respectively, trace the unfolding of the Bergcolonne’s assault on the dominant tactical feature of Umar’s stelling. The fourth and most consequential message — received by the bevelhebber only at 11:15 a.m. — reported that Lam Pisang had been abandoned and that many Acehnese were fleeing southward, and its receipt reversed the bevelhebber’s initial decision to halt operations.
Background
The offensive of 23 May 1896 had been ordered by the dispositie of 22 May 1896 signed by Kolonel Stemfoort. The Bergcolonne under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz — with Kap. Van Daalen as Chef van den Staf — was assigned the storming of the Tjot Tjako height, the dominant tactical feature of Umar’s stelling in the VI Moekims. The Bergcolonne had departed before dawn on 23 May 1896 and by 6:00 a.m. was already in contact with the enemy on the slopes of the height.
The height of Tjot Tjako was understood to be the key to Umar’s stelling: from its summit the entire line of enemy versterkingen from Lam Pisang to Lam Asan could be observed and engaged. The storming was therefore the critical operation of the first day, and Van Heutsz’s Berichten were the means by which the bevelhebber at his headquarters in the plain below followed and directed the operation.
Content
Bericht No. 1 — transmitted at 6:40 a.m. and received by the bevelhebber at 8:30 a.m. — reported that the Tjot Tjako height was “niet beklimbaar voor artillerie” (not climbable for artillery) and that the Bergcolonne would have to ascend the south saddle of the height on foot, under covering fire. The message also requested drinkwater (drinking water): “Toean Tjot Tjako niet beklimbaar voor artillerie, moet zadel Zuid van dien berg beklimmen onder dekking. Versoek drinkwater.”
Bericht No. 2 — transmitted at 8:17 a.m. — reported that granaten (shells) were falling in Lam Pisang and requested reserve munitie (ammunition), drinkwater, and ijs (ice). The message was given to a forced labourer named Van Beers for delivery, along with a note from the bevelhebber to Van Heutsz.
Bericht No. 3 — undated but mid-morning — was addressed to the commandants of the 6e Bataljon and the 2e Bergbatterij (Kapitein Kempers): “Commandant 6’, versoeke dekking aan den voet van het gebergte voor transport gewonden naar Ketapaan Doea. Commandant 2e bergbatterij, kapitein Kempers. Niet meer dan eene sectie naar boven sturen. Geen plaats. Tracht den hoofdrug te volgen naar hoogsten top.” (Commander 6th Battalion, please provide cover at the foot of the mountain for the transport of wounded to Ketapan Doewa. Commander 2nd Mountain Battery, Captain Kempers: send no more than one section to the top. No room. Try to follow the main ridge to the highest peak.)
Bericht No. 4 — transmitted at 9:15 a.m. but received by the bevelhebber only at 11:15 a.m. — was the decisive message: “Lam Pisang verlaten. Wij hebben heuveltop ten O. van Oemar’s huis bezet. Bineh Kroeng also verlaten. Vele Atjehers loopen weg in Z. richting. Troepen kunnen doorrukken. Versoeke toezending bereden ordonnansen.” (Lam Pisang abandoned. We have occupied the hilltop east of Oemar’s house. Bineh Kroeng also abandoned. Many Acehnese are fleeing in a southerly direction. Troops can advance. Please send mounted orderlies.)
Reception and Aftermath
The four Berichten drove the operational decisions of the bevelhebber on 23 May 1896. After receiving Bericht No. 1 and Bericht No. 2, the bevelhebber received a telephonic advice from the Regeeringscommissaris suggesting that operations be halted. The bevelhebber initially accepted this advice and was on the point of ordering a halt when Bericht No. 4 arrived at 11:15 a.m. The receipt of Bericht No. 4 — with its report that Lam Pisang was abandoned and that Acehnese were fleeing southward — reversed the bevelhebber’s decision, and operations were resumed. The Bergcolonne descended from Tjot Tjako into the plain; Lam-Pisang and Umar’s house were captured the following day, 24 May 1896, and the final storming of Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau followed on 25 May 1896.
Significance
The Berichten No. 1–4 are the primary operational record of the storming of Tjot Tjako and of the decisive moment at which the three-day offensive turned from a contested ascent into a breakthrough. Bericht No. 4 in particular — with its fourfold content of abandoned enemy positions, occupied Dutch positions, fleeing Acehnese, and a request for mounted orderlies — is the single message that converted the bevelhebber’s plan to halt into a decision to continue, and its delayed receipt (9:15 a.m. sent, 11:15 a.m. received) is a striking instance of the role of communication delay in nineteenth-century colonial warfare. As a historical document, the Berichten are preserved in the narrative of ATJEH ‘96 rather than in the Bijlagen — their operational rather than political character kept them out of the official annexes — but their importance to the narrative is such that Kruisheer preserves them in full, in the original Dutch.
See Also
- J. B. van Heutsz
- J. W. Stemfoort
- Luitenant-Generaal Vetter
- G. C. H. van Daalen
- Three-day Dutch offensive of 23–25 May 1896
- Slag bij Tjot Tjako (23 May 1896)
- Capture of Lam-Pisang and Oemar’s house (24 May 1896)
- Bergcolonne (23 May 1896)
- Dispositie (operation order) of 22 May 1896 — Operatiën tegen de VI Moekims
- Telefonisch advies van de Regeeringscommissaris (23 May 1896)
- 1896
Source
ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 189, 190, 190–191, 192.