Terwogt's account of the Atjeh-oorlog (1891)

Terwogt’s account of the Atjeh-oorlog, as recorded in the closing pages of Het Land van Jan Pieterszoon Coen by Dr. W. A. Terwogt (Hoorn: P. Geerts, [1891]), is the popular Dutch narrative of the Atjeh-oorlog from the 1857 treaty of Jan van Swieten through the two expeditions of 1873–1874 to the protracted guerrilla of the 1880s, ending with the hope that the new Minister of Colonies, W. K. Baron van Dedem, will bring the war to a conclusion. The account is a document of the Dutch colonial public’s understanding of the Atjeh-oorlog at the end of 1891 — a moment when the war was, by the author’s own acknowledgment, far from over.

The diplomatic prelude (1857–1872)

Terwogt traces the diplomatic prelude to the Atjeh-oorlog from the 1857 treaty of Jan van Swieten — the tractaat by which the two parties agreed to admit each other’s subjects to trade, to co-operate against piracy, and by which the Sultan bound himself to suppress strandroof (beach-piracy). The treaty was, in Terwogt’s judgment, “mooi op het papier, maar bleek in de werkelijkheid slechts in zand geschreven” — beautiful on paper, but in reality proved to be written in sand. The Sultan “bleek spoedig meer beloofd te hebben, dan hij kon houden” (soon proved to have promised more than he could keep).

The Sumatra Treaty of 2 November 1871 — by which the Netherlands acquired greater freedom of action on Sumatra in exchange for the cession of Dutch possessions on the coast of Guinea (West Africa) — is noted as the diplomatic turning-point: the treaty “sloeg op Atjeh, het eenige Rijk op Sumatra, dat nog niet van Nederland afhankelijk was geworden” (referred to Atjeh, the only kingdom on Sumatra that had not yet become dependent on the Netherlands). Once the treaty freed the Dutch hands on Sumatra, the government resolved on a firmer posture toward Atjeh.

The diplomatic prelude of 1872 is then narrated in detail: the Atjehnese appeal to the Sultan of Turkey (first made in 1868, renewed in 1872); the Atjehnese embassy to Riouw, where the envoy, lacking a volmacht (authorisation), was received by the Resident but entered into no further negotiation; the Dutch envoy who was “eenvoudig niet ontvangen” (simply not received) by the Sultan; the Atjehnese appeals to the agents of various powers in Singapore, under the pretext that the Netherlands wished to annex their kingdom; and the Atjehnese appeal to France for help. The “dubbelhartige handelwijze” (double-dealing) of the Atjehnese — using the delay to seek foreign intervention while pretending to negotiate — drove the Dutch government, “die alle vreemde inmenging wilde voorkomen” (which wished to prevent all foreign interference), to “sneller dan zij vermoedelijk anders gedaan zou hebben” (faster than it probably otherwise would have) resolve on doortastend optreden (decisive action).

The first expedition (March–April 1873)

The first expedition is narrated as a Dutch defeat. Nieuwenhuizen, the Vice-President of the Raad van Indië, was appointed Commissaris and dispatched with four warships; the troop force of 3,600 was assembled under Generaal-Majoor Köhler. Nieuwenhuizen arrived at the roadstead of Atjeh on 22 March 1873; his first letter was answered with the excuse that no decision could be taken before the answer from Turkey was received; his second, the ultimatum, was answered with new excuses. The declaration of war followed on 26 March; two more days’ delay were granted at the Atjehnese request, but as the Atjehnese continued to fortify their defence-works, these were bombarded by the marine ships on 28 March.

The troops arrived on 5 April 1873. “Opnieuw, gelijk reeds zoo menigmaal te voren, begon men dezen oorlog met te geringe macht, overmoedig, met volkomen miskenning van de dapperheid en doodsverachting der Atjehers” — once again, as so many times before, one began this war with too small a force, overconfident, with complete misappreciation of the bravery and death-defiance of the Atjehnese. The reconnaissance of 6 April failed to take a fort by assault; the mosque was taken on 10 April and, instead of being held, was abandoned, so that it had to be re-taken on 14 April at the cost of numerous casualties. On the same day, Generaal-Majoor Köhler fell in a continued reconnaissance; Kolonel Van Daalen replaced him. On 16 April the Dutch suffered “volmaakte onzen tegenspoed” (complete adversity): Van Daalen advanced against the Kraton — “zonder nauwkeurig bekend te zijn met de ligging van den Kraton” (without being accurately acquainted with the position of the Kraton) — and the Dutch troops were so heavily battered by the enemy’s fire that a return to the bivouac had to be decided upon. On 25 April 1873 the troops were re-embarked.

“Zoo eindigde deze expeditie op treurige wijze. Wij hadden de nederlaag geleden.” — Thus ended this expedition in a sad manner. We had suffered the defeat. “De moed en het zelfgevoel der Atjehers was, zooals vanzelf spreekt, niet weinig verhoogd en ons prestige in Indië niet weinig verlaagd.” — The courage and the self-confidence of the Atjehnese was, as is self-evident, not a little increased, and our prestige in the Indies not a little lowered. “Ieder Nederlander gevoelde, dat niet alleen tegenover de bevolking onzer Indische bezittingen, maar ook en niet minder tegenover Europa, de geleden nederlaag moest uitgewischt, gewroken worden.” — Every Dutchman felt that, not only before the population of our Indies possessions, but also and no less before Europe, the suffered defeat had to be wiped out, avenged.

The second expedition (December 1873–January 1874)

The second expedition — over 6,000 strong — was dispatched in the second half of November 1873 under the supreme command of the retired former commander of the Indies army, Jan van Swieten. The expedition began under unfavourable auspices: cholera had broken out on the transport ships, and would claim numerous victims throughout. On 9 December 1873, the landing was undertaken under Verspijck; supported by the fire of the steamships, Verspijck drove the Atjehnese from their fortifications on the right bank of the Atjeh river. The campaign pushed southward, taking the mosque of 6 January 1874 and, on 24 January 1874, occupying the Kraton — found deserted, so that this important point could be occupied without bloodshed.

As it had become clear that the Sultan’s authority over his people was “gelijk nul” (as nothing), and as his death was later reported, while the resistance “geenszins in kracht verminderde” (by no means diminished in strength), the Dutch resolved on a different policy: setting aside the Sultansbestuur (sultan’s government), they established a duurzame vestiging (durable settlement) and entered into direct negotiation with the onderhoorige Staten (subordinate states). A proclamation with a letter, containing conditions for submission, was sent to the heads of those states for signature; nearly half of the statelets — along the North as well as the West coast — recognised Dutch authority. Van Swieten confined himself to the conquered territory, fortified the Kraton — which received the name Kota-Radja — and some other points, and in the last days of April returned a large part of the troops to Java. The command over the 3,000 left behind, and the political leadership, was entrusted to J. L. J. H. Pel.

The protracted guerrilla (1874–1891)

The closing judgment of Terwogt’s account is the acknowledgment that the war continued unabated: “En van dien tijd af, tot nu toe, eind 1891, duurt de tegenstand der Atjehers onverzwakt voort, dank zij de wisselende houding van ons Gouvernement, dat dan weer in een krachtdadig, dan weer in een verzoenend optreden tegen de slechts voor overmacht bukkende Atjehers heil zocht.” — And from that time to the present, end of 1891, the resistance of the Atjehnese continues unabated, thanks to the wavering attitude of our Government, which sought salvation now in a vigorous, now in a conciliatory approach to the Atjehnese, who bow only before superior force.

The hope placed in the new Minister of Colonies, W. K. Baron van Dedem, who declared in his memorie van antwoord on the Indies budget of 1892 that he expected no good from “toegeven en zachtheid” (yielding and softness) toward the “fanatieken Atjeher” (fanatical Atjehnese), closes the account. Terwogt’s final word: “Wij hebben goed vertrouwen dat voor het taaie geduld van den Hollander en de zich nooit verloochenende dapperheid van ons leger, eindelijk ook Atjeh het hoofd in den schoot zal leggen.” — We have good confidence that, for the stubborn patience of the Dutchman and the never-disowning bravery of our army, finally also Atjeh will lay its head in its lap.

Significance

For AcehWiki, Terwogt’s account of the Atjeh-oorlog is significant as a popular Dutch narrative of the war — written for the general Dutch reader at the end of 1891 — that treats the diplomatic prelude, the two expeditions, and the protracted guerrilla within a single patriotic narrative. The account is notable for its frankness: the first expedition is acknowledged as a defeat, the guerrilla is acknowledged to continue “onverzwakt” (unabated), and the blame for the protraction is laid on the “wisselende houding” (wavering attitude) of the Dutch government. The account is a document of the Dutch colonial public’s understanding of the Atjeh-oorlog at a moment when the war was far from over, and it records the hope placed in the firm policy of the new Minister van Dedem — a hope that would, within a few years, be realised in the governorship of Van Heutsz and the pacification of Atjeh.

Source

Het Land van Jan Pieterszoon Coen, door Dr. W. A. Terwogt (Hoorn: P. Geerts, [1891]). Hoofdstuk XIII: “Onze geschiedenis in Oost-Indië tot aan den oorlog met Atjeh (1850–1873),” and the closing pages on the Atjeh-oorlog 1873–1891.

tags	concept, account, colonial, military, atjeh, aceh-war, 1857, 1871, 1873, 1874, 1891, terwogt, popular-history
aliases	Terwogt Atjeh-oorlog, Terwogt account of the Aceh War, Het Land van Jan Pieterszoon Coen Atjeh-oorlog, Terwogt 1891 Atjeh, Atjeh-oorlog Terwogt

Explorer