A. van der Waag was a lieutenant of the Netherlands Indies Army who, on 25 March 25 March 1942, volunteered to lead an eleven-man reconnaissance unit half a day’s march ahead of Captain Van Nues’s reconstituted detachment at Blangkedjeren. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Van der Waag’s reconnaissance of 27 March 27 March 1942 is the last successful Dutch infantry action of the Atjeh campaign: a fighting reconnaissance that drew a Japanese battalion into the Dutch mortars and machine guns and inflicted about 30 casualties for no Dutch loss.
Appointment to the reconnaissance unit
When, on 23 March 23 March 1942, Colonel Gosenson resolved to reconstitute the Blangkedjeren troops under Captain Van Nues, Van Nues was given the further resource of an eleven-man reconnaissance unit under Van der Waag. The members of the unit had all volunteered for the task. Van der Waag’s orders were to operate half a day’s march ahead of the main detachment, to reconnoitre the Takengon–Blangkedjeren path, and to occupy and prepare positions from which any Japanese breakthrough from the Takengon direction could be blocked.
The 27 March 1942 reconnaissance
On the morning of 27 March 27 March 1942, after Van Nues had reconnoitred the foreground and the fighting positions had been occupied, Van der Waag sent a messenger back with a report of the enemy’s approach — strength (one battalion), direction of march, and speed of march. He had, he reported, deliberately drawn the enemy toward the Dutch position, presenting the mortars and machine guns with an excellent target and inflicting heavy losses (approximately 30 killed). The losses were confirmed through Lt Westerweel, who was being held by the Japanese as a hostage and could observe the engagement.
By the skilful manner in which Lieutenant Van der Waag carried out his withdrawal, the Japanese were kept in uncertainty not only about the strength of his patrol but also about that of the units following it. The Japanese advance became highly cautious, significantly delaying the Japanese advance on Blangkedjeren and gaining the Dutch almost a full day.
Significance
Van der Waag’s reconnaissance is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the single clear tactical success of the Dutch defence in the Blangkedjeren theatre — a success attributed by the compilers to Van der Waag’s personal handling of the withdrawal. The contrast with the mass desertions that overtook Van Nues’s main detachment in the same engagement is the staff history’s principal illustration of the gap between the example set by competent Dutch officers and the spirit of the indigenous soldiers they commanded.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- F. J. van Nues
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- J. F. Westerweel
- Sumatra capitulation (28 March 1942)
- Blangkedjeren
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 149–150.
A. van der Waag was a lieutenant of the Netherlands Indies Army who, on 25 March 25 March 1942, volunteered to lead an eleven-man reconnaissance unit half a day’s march ahead of Captain Van Nues’s reconstituted detachment at Blangkedjeren. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Van der Waag’s reconnaissance of 27 March 27 March 1942 is the last successful Dutch infantry action of the Atjeh campaign: a fighting reconnaissance that drew a Japanese battalion into the Dutch mortars and machine guns and inflicted about 30 casualties for no Dutch loss.
Appointment to the reconnaissance unit
When, on 23 March 23 March 1942, Colonel Gosenson resolved to reconstitute the Blangkedjeren troops under Captain Van Nues, Van Nues was given the further resource of an eleven-man reconnaissance unit under Van der Waag. The members of the unit had all volunteered for the task. Van der Waag’s orders were to operate half a day’s march ahead of the main detachment, to reconnoitre the Takengon–Blangkedjeren path, and to occupy and prepare positions from which any Japanese breakthrough from the Takengon direction could be blocked.
The 27 March 1942 reconnaissance
On the morning of 27 March 27 March 1942, after Van Nues had reconnoitred the foreground and the fighting positions had been occupied, Van der Waag sent a messenger back with a report of the enemy’s approach — strength (one battalion), direction of march, and speed of march. He had, he reported, deliberately drawn the enemy toward the Dutch position, presenting the mortars and machine guns with an excellent target and inflicting heavy losses (approximately 30 killed). The losses were confirmed through Lt Westerweel, who was being held by the Japanese as a hostage and could observe the engagement.
By the skilful manner in which Lieutenant Van der Waag carried out his withdrawal, the Japanese were kept in uncertainty not only about the strength of his patrol but also about that of the units following it. The Japanese advance became highly cautious, significantly delaying the Japanese advance on Blangkedjeren and gaining the Dutch almost a full day.
Significance
Van der Waag’s reconnaissance is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the single clear tactical success of the Dutch defence in the Blangkedjeren theatre — a success attributed by the compilers to Van der Waag’s personal handling of the withdrawal. The contrast with the mass desertions that overtook Van Nues’s main detachment in the same engagement is the staff history’s principal illustration of the gap between the example set by competent Dutch officers and the spirit of the indigenous soldiers they commanded.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- F. J. van Nues
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- J. F. Westerweel
- Sumatra capitulation (28 March 1942)
- Blangkedjeren
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 149–150.