Amacab — the Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch, also written amamacab — was the Allied civil-affairs organisation that entered Atjèh after the Japanese capitulation of 15 August 1945 and was charged, under the leadership of the Chief Co Amacab (Chief Commanding Officer, Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch) and the newly-designated Governor of Sumatra A. I. Spits, with the restoration of Dutch civil authority in the former residency. Piekaar’s Atjèh and the War with Japan treats Amacab as the instrument through which the plans for Allied re-occupation of Sumatra were prepared — and as the apparatus whose failure to materialise beyond Sabang, Medan, Padang and Palembang opened the door to the 1945–1946 “social revolution” that destroyed oelèëbalang power in Atjèh.
Origins and structure
Amacab was the civil-affairs arm of the Allied Military Administration established under the South East Asia Command (Sacsea — Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia). In Atjèh, civil affairs were vested in the Dutch administration, “the latter as part of the Amacab (Allied military administration civil affairs branch),” which entered the residency alongside the Dutch navy after the Japanese capitulation in August 1945. The Dutch administration was represented in the person of A. I. Spits, who had been designated Governor of Sumatra. “The plans, prepared under the leadership of the Chief Co Amacab (Chief commanding officer allied military administration civil affairs branch), the Governor of Sumatra A. I. Spits, had to remain unused” — the casus belli of Atjèh’s post-war tragedy.
The first landings at Sabang
The first Allied entry into Atjèhnese territory came at Sabang. “Still in August the English fleet appeared before Sabang and a temporary naval base was established on Sabang. Also the Dutch navy and the Dutch administration, the latter as part of the Amacab, made their entry. The thousands of enterprise workers from Aceh, East Sumatra and Tapanoeli, who on the island had performed slave labor for the Japanese army, were transferred to the mainland, to be sent back to their place of origin through the care of the Japanese authorities.” Sabang, which the Japanese had held as a naval base since 1942 and which had been liberated by Hr. Ms. Tromp in July 1944, was the only part of Atjèh where Amacab exercised full civil authority; on the mainland, “the Allied — English — occupation was limited to the places Medan, Padang and Palembang.”
The 1.3.6. force and Major Knottenbelt
For the mainland of Atjèh, Amacab’s instrument was the “1.3.6. force,” whose reconnaissance party under B. W. Lefrandt — “former receiver at the customs and excise service in Sigli” — was already in the mountainous region of Seulimeum preparing for the airborne phase of the planned invasion when the capitulation came. On 5 October 1945 a “party of the ‘A.D.C.S. 1.3.6. force’,” under Major M. J. Knottenbelt of the Dutch commando troops, arrived in Koetaradja by order of Sacsea. Knottenbelt’s preliminary final report, reproduced by Piekaar, warned that “the absence of an Allied representative in Aceh can lead to a deterioration of the situation,” since “Aceh can be compared to a powder keg, only a spark is needed to make it explode.” “Major Knottenbelt was not replaced and an Allied occupation did not materialize.”
The non-occupation and its consequences
The non-materialisation of Amacab beyond Sabang was, in Piekaar’s reading, the immediate cause of the 1945–1946 catastrophe. The oelèëbalangs, “freed from Japanese pressure, immediately set about to restore their old position of power,” and rallied around Teukoe Hadji Tjhi’ Moehamad Djohan Alam Sjah of Peusangan. But with no Allied force to interpose itself, the Poesa-inspired cadres of the dissolved PETA and the survivors of the Masubuchi-kikan seized the opportunity. By December 1945 the civil war between the oelama party and the oelèëbalang class was raging from Lam Meuló to Sigli and Bireuën, ending in the destruction of oelèëbalang authority. “A timely Allied occupation,” Piekaar concludes, “on which the oelèëbalangs had pinned their hopes to the last, could have prevented worse here.”
See Also
- A. I. Spits
- Japanese capitulation of 15 August 1945
- Sabang
- Koetaradja
- Seulimeum
- Teukoe Hadji Tjhi’ Moehamad Djohan Alam Sjah
- PETA
- Masubuchi-kikan
- Medan
- 1945
Source
Atjèh and the War with Japan, by Dr. A. J. Piekaar, translated from the Dutch original Atjèh en de oorlog met Japan (1949) (‘s-Gravenhage/Bandung: N.V. Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve; English edition), Glossary and Chapter VII § 4, Chapter XIII.
Amacab — the Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch, also written amamacab — was the Allied civil-affairs organisation that entered Atjèh after the Japanese capitulation of 15 August 1945 and was charged, under the leadership of the Chief Co Amacab (Chief Commanding Officer, Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch) and the newly-designated Governor of Sumatra A. I. Spits, with the restoration of Dutch civil authority in the former residency. Piekaar’s Atjèh and the War with Japan treats Amacab as the instrument through which the plans for Allied re-occupation of Sumatra were prepared — and as the apparatus whose failure to materialise beyond Sabang, Medan, Padang and Palembang opened the door to the 1945–1946 “social revolution” that destroyed oelèëbalang power in Atjèh.
Origins and structure
Amacab was the civil-affairs arm of the Allied Military Administration established under the South East Asia Command (Sacsea — Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia). In Atjèh, civil affairs were vested in the Dutch administration, “the latter as part of the Amacab (Allied military administration civil affairs branch),” which entered the residency alongside the Dutch navy after the Japanese capitulation in August 1945. The Dutch administration was represented in the person of A. I. Spits, who had been designated Governor of Sumatra. “The plans, prepared under the leadership of the Chief Co Amacab (Chief commanding officer allied military administration civil affairs branch), the Governor of Sumatra A. I. Spits, had to remain unused” — the casus belli of Atjèh’s post-war tragedy.
The first landings at Sabang
The first Allied entry into Atjèhnese territory came at Sabang. “Still in August the English fleet appeared before Sabang and a temporary naval base was established on Sabang. Also the Dutch navy and the Dutch administration, the latter as part of the Amacab, made their entry. The thousands of enterprise workers from Aceh, East Sumatra and Tapanoeli, who on the island had performed slave labor for the Japanese army, were transferred to the mainland, to be sent back to their place of origin through the care of the Japanese authorities.” Sabang, which the Japanese had held as a naval base since 1942 and which had been liberated by Hr. Ms. Tromp in July 1944, was the only part of Atjèh where Amacab exercised full civil authority; on the mainland, “the Allied — English — occupation was limited to the places Medan, Padang and Palembang.”
The 1.3.6. force and Major Knottenbelt
For the mainland of Atjèh, Amacab’s instrument was the “1.3.6. force,” whose reconnaissance party under B. W. Lefrandt — “former receiver at the customs and excise service in Sigli” — was already in the mountainous region of Seulimeum preparing for the airborne phase of the planned invasion when the capitulation came. On 5 October 1945 a “party of the ‘A.D.C.S. 1.3.6. force’,” under Major M. J. Knottenbelt of the Dutch commando troops, arrived in Koetaradja by order of Sacsea. Knottenbelt’s preliminary final report, reproduced by Piekaar, warned that “the absence of an Allied representative in Aceh can lead to a deterioration of the situation,” since “Aceh can be compared to a powder keg, only a spark is needed to make it explode.” “Major Knottenbelt was not replaced and an Allied occupation did not materialize.”
The non-occupation and its consequences
The non-materialisation of Amacab beyond Sabang was, in Piekaar’s reading, the immediate cause of the 1945–1946 catastrophe. The oelèëbalangs, “freed from Japanese pressure, immediately set about to restore their old position of power,” and rallied around Teukoe Hadji Tjhi’ Moehamad Djohan Alam Sjah of Peusangan. But with no Allied force to interpose itself, the Poesa-inspired cadres of the dissolved PETA and the survivors of the Masubuchi-kikan seized the opportunity. By December 1945 the civil war between the oelama party and the oelèëbalang class was raging from Lam Meuló to Sigli and Bireuën, ending in the destruction of oelèëbalang authority. “A timely Allied occupation,” Piekaar concludes, “on which the oelèëbalangs had pinned their hopes to the last, could have prevented worse here.”
See Also
- A. I. Spits
- Japanese capitulation of 15 August 1945
- Sabang
- Koetaradja
- Seulimeum
- Teukoe Hadji Tjhi’ Moehamad Djohan Alam Sjah
- PETA
- Masubuchi-kikan
- Medan
- 1945
Source
Atjèh and the War with Japan, by Dr. A. J. Piekaar, translated from the Dutch original Atjèh en de oorlog met Japan (1949) (‘s-Gravenhage/Bandung: N.V. Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve; English edition), Glossary and Chapter VII § 4, Chapter XIII.