The Storm on the Kraton (1 April 1873) was the failed frontal assault on the Kraton of Atjeh launched by Generaal Köhler’s expeditionary force under the personal leadership of Majoor Cavaljé on 1 April 1873, which collapsed when a single Dutch compagnie that had reached the hoofdpoort (main gate) was left unsupported, Köhler was killed outside the walls, and the Atjehneezen counter-attacked from all sides. In Borel’s account the storm’s failure settled the fate of the entire first expedition.
The Defences
The Kraton confronting the Dutch was an earthen omwalling crowned by a “levenden muur van bamboe-doeri” — a living hedge of thorny bamboo — that no field gun then in the expedition’s train could seriously injure. Whether the wall was of earth or of stone, the lichte veldgeschut brought ashore by Köhler, Borel writes, could have had “geene voldoende uitwerking” against it. The Dutch had no schwer belegeringsgeschut worthy of the name, no sappe-work had been opened, and the bedekt, palm-overgrown terrain cancelled out the range advantage of the new Beaumont-geweren. The Atjehneezen, fighting with “woede en verbittering, die aan het ongeloofelijke grensden,” held every borstwering, schietkoker and gracht with the fierce independence Borel would later characterise as their volkskarakter.
The Assault
On the morning of 1 April 1873 the stormaanval went in under the wakkeren Majoor Cavaljé. Battalion after battalion pushed forward across the open ground toward the hoofdpoort. For one tantalising moment the Dutch came “zeer dicht bij het succes”: a single compagnie actually stood “vóór de hoofdpoort van den Kraton” and was on the point of bursting in. The support that should have followed never came — Borel blames the “niet voldoende steunen” of the attacking compagnie — and he adds that, even had the gate been forced, it was “zeer de vraag” whether the Dutch could have held the binnenruimte against the swarming counter-attack that would have enveloped them. At that critical instant Köhler himself was struck down and killed outside the walls. The death of the opperbevelhebber at the turning point of the assault broke the impetus of the attack; from every side the Atjehneezen came “opdringende,” and the storm collapsed into a costly withdrawal.
Consequences
The combined shock — the death of Köhler, the failure of the storm, the “groot aantal onzer dooden en gekwetsten” — shattered the moreel of the troepen and brought the vertrouwen of the aanvoerders “aan het wankelen.” Borel is understanding: under such circumstances, he writes, it is “zeer goed te begrijpen” that the generals chose to staken the fight rather than expose the force to a second butcher’s bill. He insists, however, that the failure cannot be reduced to the poor handling of artillerie, the failure to prepare the storm, or even the geheel verlaten der kust without holding a versterkt punt — for even without these fouten, and even had Köhler not been killed, the doel might still have eluded the voorhanden middelen. The withdrawal that followed forced the inquiry and set the stage for the second expedition of November 1873, whose bombardment and omtrekkende beweging would do in January 1874 what the April storm had failed to do.
See Also
- First Aceh Expedition (April 1873)
- Generaal Köhler
- Majoor Cavaljé
- Kraton of Atjeh
- Bamboe-doeri versperringen
- Beaumont-geweer
- Second Aceh Expedition (1873–1874)
- 1873
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 9, 34, 70, 84.