Snijders’ rapport on German projectiles of 22 July 22 July 1884 and 13 June 13 June 1885 were the two reports submitted by Kapitein-Ingenieur C. J. Snijders from Magdeburg to the Dutch Minister of War, in which he communicated his discovery of the German trials of a new type of high-explosive projectile (schietkatoen-granaten) that would make the bomb-free cover of all existing fortress buildings illusory, and in which he developed his ideas on the way in which bomb-free cover would in future have to be obtained and on the influence of the new weapon on permanent fortification. The reports led directly to the halt in the further build-out of the Stelling van Amsterdam in 1886 pending insight into the path to be taken, and are the foundation of Snijders’ reputation as one of the foremost Dutch fortress-builders of his generation.
The Discovery at Magdeburg
During his posting to Magdeburg (1882–1886) to supervise the manufacture of armour for the Dutch coast forts at the firm Gruson — see Snijders’s biography — Snijders heard by rumour of the German trials of a new type of brisant projectile that would make the bomb-free cover of all existing fortress buildings illusory. As this question was of vital importance for the Dutch fortified lines — and in particular for the Stelling van Amsterdam, then under construction — Snijders attempted to inform himself further. At great pains, and despite the anxious secrecy of the German authorities, he succeeded in confirming the rumours.
The Rapport of 22 July 1884
On 22 July 22 July 1884 Snijders submitted his first report to the Minister of War. The report communicated the existence of the new German projectiles. Although the Department was not fully convinced of the correctness of his communications, Snijders continued his investigations.
The Rapport of 13 June 1885
On 13 June 13 June 1885 Snijders submitted a fuller report. On the basis of information drawn partly from conversations — including with the Prussian oud-Majoor der Genie Schumann, who was attached to the Gruson factory — and partly from visits to schietkatoen factories and the like, he was able to give a fuller account of the new projectiles and their effect, and to develop his ideas on the way in which bomb-free cover would in future have to be obtained and on the influence of the new weapon on permanent fortification.
The Halt of 1886
It was on the basis of the 13 June 13 June 1885 report that in 1886 the further build-out of the Stelling van Amsterdam was halted pending insight into the path to be taken. Snijders treated the same question in an extensive article in De Militaire Spectator of 1886–1887, “Schietkatoen en schietkatoen-granaten,” which excited much interest and produced a stir in military circles.
Significance
The two reports are the foundation of Snijders’ reputation as one of the foremost Dutch fortress-builders of his generation. They demonstrate his capacity for technical intelligence work — conducted against the anxious secrecy of the German authorities and at some personal risk — and his ability to translate technical intelligence into strategic prescription. They are also one of the channels through which the Atjeh experience of the Bataillon Mineurs en Sappeurs officer was applied to the defence of the Netherlands: Snijders’ early experience of the limits of sandbag fortification under fire in Atjeh gave him a particular sensitivity to the obsolescence of fixed fortification under the new brisant projectiles.
See Also
- Cornelis Jacobus Snijders
- Stelling van Amsterdam
- Korps Ingenieurs, Mineurs en Sappeurs
- Handboek der Pionierkunst voor het Nederlandsche Leger
- Benting Kota Alam operation (13 November 1874)
- Missigit Longbatta operation (31 December 1874 – 13 January 1875)
- Aceh War
- 1884
- 1885
- 1886
Source
D. van den Berg, Cornelis Jacobus Snijders (1852–1939): Een leven in dienst van zijn Land en zijn Volk (Voorburg: September 1944), pp. 44–46. Koninklijke Bibliotheek shelfmark 0301 4872.