The sabotage in Sigli was the localised fifth-column action which broke out in the subdistrict of Sigli — “the heart of the former district of Pidië” and “the bulwark of the oelèëbalang authority” — on the night of 24–25 February 1942, when railway and telephone lines were cut at Gloempang Minjeu’ in the landschap III Moekims Arón. Piekaar’s Atjèh and the War with Japan (Chapter III § 2) treats the Sigli sabotage as the controlled and contained counterpart to the revolt in Great Atjèh — the action which proved that, even in a stronghold of oelèëbalang power, the Poesa leadership felt itself “not yet … strong enough to commit the organization as such to the struggle.”
Background and outbreak
“At the beginning of the sabotages in Seulimeum, the situation in Sigli, as elsewhere in Atjèh, was calm.” In consultation with the self-governing officials, “the entire subdistrict’s railway and telephone lines were controlled by population guard posts.” Nevertheless, on the night of 24–25 February 1942, “at Gloempang Minjeu’ in the landscape III Moekims Arón, sabotage to railway and telephone lines of not serious nature occurred.” The acting self-governing official, Teukoe Gadè — “one of the less significant figures among Sigli’s self-governing officials, who had failed to control the population guard posts” — “was temporarily relieved of his duties. In his place, Teukoe Moehamad Hasan of the adjacent Gloempang Pajóng was provisionally entrusted with the administration.”
Why no large-scale revolt
Piekaar poses the central question: “May it be concluded from this that the Pusa leaders, although Sigli belonged to their foremost action centers, did not feel themselves capable of unleashing a large-scale fifth column action in this stronghold of the oelèëbalangs?” Two possibilities are canvassed. “Or did common sense prevail over political sentiment here, and was one afraid of the damage which the standing crop might suffer in the event of an action?” In either case, the Poesa leadership implicitly admitted that it “could not count on any significant support from the side of the oelèëbalangs, as was the case in Seulimeum.” The subdistrict therefore remained quiet until after the Japanese invasion, when, in the night of 12–13 March 1942, the assistant-resident Mr. B. J. van den Berg was murdered and the town partially plundered.
Significance
The Sigli sabotage showed both the reach and the limits of the Fujiwara-kikan–Poesa network. It demonstrated that even a single act of sabotage in a kota as heavily oelèëbalang-controlled as Sigli could trigger the fall of a self-governing official, but it equally demonstrated that, without Japanese troops physically present, the religious movement would not dare an open rising.
See Also
- Sigli
- Pidië
- Gloempang Pajóng
- Teukoe Moehamad Hasan
- Teukoe Gadè
- Poesa
- Fujiwara-kikan
- Revolt in Great Atjèh (1942)
- Revolt in Tjalang (1942)
- Japanese invasion of Atjèh
- 24 February 1942
- 25 February 1942
Source
Atjèh and the War with Japan, by Dr. A. J. Piekaar, translated from the Dutch original Atjèh en de oorlog met Japan (1949) (‘s-Gravenhage/Bandung: N.V. Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve; English edition), Chapter III § 2 and Chapter V § 2.