The Reconnaissance of the Atjeh-rivier (29 January 1874) was the botched reconnaissance carried out by the second Aceh expedition on 29 January 1874 — five days after the fall of the Kraton — by a colonne of two bataljons infanterie with a batterij veld-artillerie, accompanied by both generaal van Swieten and generaal Verspijck, to reconnoitre the left bank of the Atjeh-rivier above the Kraton, which near Lampoe Idjoe met unexpectedly strong resistance from both banks, exhausted its munitie, and was forced by van Swieten to “den strijd op te geven en onverrichter zake terug te trekken” — to give up the fight and withdraw with nothing accomplished — at the cost of two officers and about twenty men killed or wounded.
The Object
The Kraton had fallen on 24 January 1874. The immediate question was whether the Atjehnees army that had defended it had merely retired a short distance up the Atjeh-rivier, or whether it had dispersed altogether into the interior. A reconnaissance in force was ordered for 29 January. Two bataljons of infanterie, supported by a batterij veld-artillerie, were to advance up the left bank of the river and feel for the enemy. Both generals — van Swieten and Verspijck — accompanied the colonne, an unusual concentration of authority for what was nominally a reconnaissance. The choice of the left bank alone, Borel notes, was a critical error: an enemy on the right bank could enfilade the column with impunity, while an enemy on the left could be reinforced from the right without hindrance.
The Action
The march up the left bank began in good order. As the column approached Lampoe Idjoe — a kampong some distance above the Kraton — the Atjehneezen opened fire. To the Dutch surprise, the fire came from both banks of the river. The infantry pushed on, but at a kreek whose further bank was crowned by a versterking the column “stootten bepaald het hoofd” — knocked its head, as Borel puts it. The batterij veld-artillerie was brought up to shell the versterking, but “had spoedig al hare munitie verbruikt” — soon exhausted all its ammunition. With the infantry pinned down by fire from both banks, the artillerie silent, and no reinforcement at hand, van Swieten “besloot den strijd op te geven en onverrichter zake terug te trekken.” The column retired to the Kraton, leaving behind it two officers and “ruim 20 minderen” killed or wounded.
Borel’s Critique
The échec of 29 January 1874 was, in Borel’s account, the result of three compounded errors. The first was the decision to operate on only one bank: a reconnaissance up a river with an enemy on both banks was a textbook case of how to invite enfilading fire. The second was the failure to bring a sufficient munitie supply for the artillerie: a batterij that exhausts its munitie in a single morning’s skirmish has been sent out unprepared. The third was van Swieten’s premature decision to break off the engagement. To “den strijd opgeven” at the first check was to concede the field to the enemy and to abandon the very object for which the reconnaissance had been ordered. The Atjehneezen drew their own conclusions: a vlag was soon planted above Lampoe Idjoe, and within weeks a new benteng would crown the height, marking the limit of Dutch authority above the Kraton. The reconnaissance did, however, produce one useful result: on the same day, 29 January 1874, the bataljon Barissans van Madura arrived in the roadstead; on 1 February the 6de bataljon Infanterie followed. The reinforcements were welcome, but they came too late to retrieve the échec.
See Also
- Second Aceh Expedition (1873–1874)
- Atjeh-rivier
- Lampoe Idjoe
- Fall of the Kraton (24 January 1874)
- Jan van Swieten
- Generaal Verspijck
- Bataljon Barissans van Madura
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 33, 35–36.