Janjining ratu (literally “the promise ordained of the Prince”) is the Javanese name for the ta’liq adat — the conditional promise of divorce pronounced by the bridegroom at the conclusion of the marriage contract — which extends throughout the East Indian Archipelago, but is conspicuous in Acheh by its absence. The institution is treated at length by C. Snouck Hurgronje in The Achehnese in his chapter on the marriage contract, where its absence from Achehnese practice is explained by the peculiar social position of Achehnese women.

The Ta’liq and Its Purpose

The Mohammedan ta’liq is a voluntary declaration by which the husband, at the time of marriage, makes his wife’s right to a divorce conditional on his own future misconduct — typically on his desertion, failure to maintain, or cruel treatment of her. The declaration is made before witnesses and is binding. In olden times in Java, not only in the kingdom of Mataram, but also in such places as Chirbon and Banten, the ta’liq was ordained by the rulers of the country. The tradition of the Javanese that this adat, which extends so far beyond the limits of Java, was an invention of their great sultan Sultan Ageng is, of course, open to doubt. Still, this ta’liq was everywhere known as “the promise ordained of the Prince” (janjinïng ratu or janji daléëm) and is still so called even outside the Native States.

It is indeed customary for the official who concludes the marriage contract to enquire of the bridegroom: “Do you accept the janjining ratu?” — but this question is purely formal, since a reply in the negative is unheard of. In addition to this main departure from Mohammedan law, another unorthodox custom (which seems formerly to have been universal) still prevails in many districts: the words of the ta’liq are only uttered by the official marriage-maker, who of course speaks in the second person, and the bridegroom instead of repeating the words in the first person simply answers “yes.” According to the law, this defect in form renders the whole transaction void, yet the adat regards it as valid.

Compulsion in Practice

Such a ta’liq, whether made with or without previous parley between the bridegroom and his parents-in-law, must under Mohammedan law always be a voluntary act on the part of the former, as otherwise it would be invalid. Yet it must be understood that in the large field where the adat prevails of conditional divorce after every marriage, the chance concurrence of the wishes of all married couples cannot be regarded as the cause of this custom. As a matter of fact, where this adat holds good, it is usually compulsion or “persuasion” bordering on compulsion that carries the day.

In the provinces directly subject to the Dutch government there is, of course, in theory no such thing as compulsion in regard to the ta’liq. Both this freedom and the increasing study of the Mohammedan law cause the proper legal form for this voluntary declaration to be more largely employed in these provinces. But as a matter of fact the formula is dictated to the bridegroom in such a way that he is left to suppose in his ignorance that it forms an indispensable part of the marriage contract. The ordinary villager, or indeed any native who has not studied, knows naught of the rules of the Law in regard to the contract. He places himself entirely in the hands of the official who concludes it. When, for example, the latter, after the ratification of the contract proper, says to him: “You will now surely repeat the ta’liq according to the good adat which all men follow,” few bridegrooms would so much as conceive the possibility of refusing this request.

The Achehnese Exception

This ta’liq-adat, so far from being exceptional, is deeply rooted in the necessity for rendering the position of the married woman more favourable than it is under the Mohammedan law, while yet avoiding as far as possible all conflict with that law. The most unequivocal confirmation of this explanation is to be found in the fact that it supplies a satisfactory reason for the absence of the ta’liq from among the essential adjuncts of marriages in some countries. The two principal countries without the ta’liq-adat are Acheh and the Menangkabau territories. In both of these the woman is, so far as lodging and maintenance are concerned, practically independent of her husband, since she continues to form an integral part of the family wherein she was born. An Achehnese woman whose husband has gone as a pepper-planter to the East or West Coast and gives no sign of his existence for years may indeed feel unhappy; but as she lives in her own house either together with or in the immediate neighbourhood of her own family, she is seldom constrained to demand a dissolution of marriage by faskh. In the same way there exists no necessity for facilitating by conditional divorce such dissolution of wedlock, which is most difficult to obtain by faskh.

The absence of the janjining ratu in Acheh is thus a direct consequence of the janji jinamee system and of the matrilocal character of Achehnese marriage. Where the wife continues to live under the protection of her own kin, and where the husband’s obligations are limited to occasional visits and presents, the protective mechanism of the ta’liq is superfluous. Its absence, Hurgronje observes, is the strongest proof that the ta’liq-adat elsewhere arose from the social necessity of protecting women in patrilocal societies.

See Also

Source

The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.