Bengal inquiry to Penang (28 January 1825)

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tagsevent, correspondence, colonial, diplomacy, anglo-dutch
aliasesCalcutta-Pinang dispatch 28 January 1825, Bengal letter to Penang of 28 January 1825, Bengal dispatch of 28 January 1825

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The Bengal inquiry to Penang of 28 January 1825 — referred to by P. H. Van der Kemp as the Calcutta-Pinang dispatch of 28 January 1825 — was the letter by which the Governor-General of Bengal in Council at Calcutta sought the advice of the government of Penang on the measures, if any, to be adopted for transforming the 1819 Acheh convention into a “mere commercial arrangement” with the sultan of Acheh, in accordance with the authority granted by the London dispatch of 4 August 1824. The Bengal government’s letter recorded its own opinion that the 1819 convention had always been a dead letter; reported the death of Sultan Jauhar Alum in 1823 and the consequent increase of the divisions in his house; and observed that the Three Sagis with the Queen-Mother now exercised authority at Banda Acheh, if authority there was. The inquiry triggered the despatch of the Malay translator Anderson on a mission of inquiry to the Achehnese coast, and ultimately produced Governor Fullerton’s celebrated minute on Acheh of 21 March 1825 and his Pinang Nota of 1825.

Background

The London dispatch of 4 August 1824 had transmitted the ratified Anglo-Dutch treaty of 17 March 1824 to the Governor-General of Bengal in Council at Calcutta, with instructions that the 1819 Acheh convention was to be regarded as a dead letter and authorising the Governor-General to enter into a “mere commercial arrangement” with the sultan of Acheh in its place, should he think it desirable. The dispatch had observed that the Netherlands plenipotentiaries, in their counter-nota annexed to the treaty, contemplated the existence of the king of Acheh “in a state of independence after England shall have withdrawn herself from Sumatra”; and that the Governor-General was “at liberty to enter into a mere commercial arrangement with him, if you should think it desirable.”

The Governor-General in Council, before deciding what steps to take, sought the advice of the government of Penang — the British settlement that, since its cession in 1786 (see Treaty of Quedah), had been charged with the supervision of British relations with the northern Sumatran states.

The inquiry

By letter of 28 January 1825 the Bengal government wrote to Penang:

“As the instructions from Europe contemplate the formation of a mere commercial arrangement with the King of Acheen, and, specifically, of one which shall secure the British vessels and subjects a hospitable reception in the port of that kingdom, we request that you will state your sentiments to us regarding the measures, if any, which it may be desirable to adopt for the attainment of those limited objects; and we authorise you to treat with the existing Government of the country for effecting the special arrangement pointed out in the Note of His Majesty’s plenipotentiaries, should you conceive it necessary to take steps at once without awaiting the delay of reference.”

The Bengal letter further recorded the Governor-General in Council’s own opinion on the state of Acheh. It recognised the 1819 convention as a “dead letter”: “never was Sultan Djohor in a position to fulfil the provisions; his decease in 1823 had increased the divisions in his house and weakened the sultan’s party still further; the Three Sagis with the Queen-Mother now exercised the authority, if authority there could be said to be; and these, masters of the situation, had not only given no proofs of friendship, but a marked aversion.” Further interference seemed hopeless; nevertheless, the Bengal government wished to have the advice of the government of Penang before informing the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

The Penang response

The Penang government, “wishing to comply with this order”, judged that the Achehnese situation must first be examined. But the situation was so confused and insecure that a diplomatic mission seemed highly objectionable. For this reason the Malay translator Anderson was sent on a mission of inquiry to the principal merchants in frequent intercourse with Acheh. He found that all the harbour chiefs had made themselves virtually independent of the central authority — a finding that confirmed the Penang government in its existing conviction that no good was to be expected from a further commercial treaty with Acheh. Indeed, the Penang government no longer considered such a treaty necessary. The more harbour chiefs were independent, the more harbours stood open to Penang’s trade, the less tax was levied by the central authority, the more advantageous it was for British shipping.

On this basis, Governor Fullerton of Penang, with the concurrence of his council members W. A. Clubley and R. Ibbetson (whose own intervention proposal of February 1824 had already set out the strategic case for British action on the Achehnese coast), wrote his celebrated minute on Acheh of 21 March 1825 for the Bengal government, in which he pointed out that, thanks to the Dutch declaration of Acheh’s independence, the British could prevent the Dutch from passing from article 3 to article 2 on Sumatra’s East Coast — that is, from enforcing any duties at all. The minute was followed by Fullerton’s Pinang Nota of 1825, in which the same argument was set out in more formal terms.

Significance

The Bengal inquiry of 28 January 1825 is, in Van der Kemp’s analysis, the document that translates the diplomatic settlement of London into a strategic problem for the British Indian government. The London dispatch of 4 August 1824 had spoken of a “mere commercial arrangement”; the Bengal inquiry of 28 January 1825 made that arrangement contingent on the advice of the government of Penang — the very settlement whose commercial interests were most directly threatened by any Dutch extension of authority on Sumatra’s East Coast. Governor Fullerton’s response, in the minute of 21 March 1825 and the Pinang Nota of 1825, was therefore predictable; and the train of strategic argument that he set in motion would dominate British policy on Sumatra for the next half-century, until the Sumatra Treaty of 1871 at last authorised the Dutch to extend their authority over the island.

See Also

Source

Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159-239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.

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