The ambush of the Buijs detachment (4 March 1876) was the attack by an overwhelming Atjehnese force on a Dutch detachment of 74 bayonets and one section of mountain artillery marching from Kajoe-Lē via Lamsajoeng to Longbatah, in the narrows between Lamsajoeng and Tjot Bēhēl. It cost 1 killed and 19 wounded, was the immediate cause of the isolation of the Dutch column at Kajoe-Lē, and therefore of the operation against Lambaroe three days later. It was described by H. F. Meijer in Atjeh van 26 December 1875 tot 4 September 1876 (1883).
Background
After the occupation of the XXV Moekims, the enemy had concentrated ever more strongly in the kampongs Lambaroe and Lamtengah south of the Dutch posts, where he even built fortifications, gathered the ripe paddy at night and cut the road between Kajoe-Lē and Longbatah. Major B. E. Mekern’s column — the right half of the 13e Bataljon — could spare no more than 100 to 150 men for the protection of its transports, and the enemy’s attacks grew bolder by the day.
The ambush
On 4 March a detachment of 74 bayonets and one section (8 cM. mountain gun) marched from Kajoe-Lē along Lamsajoeng towards Longbatah, to bring some sick men to Kota Radja. In the narrow passage between Lamsajoeng and Tjot Bēhēl the transport was suddenly attacked in front and on both flanks by an overwhelming enemy force. The detachment commander, First Lieutenant of Infantry T. W. J. Buijs, managed, by effective and skilful measures and with the good cooperation of his subordinate officers and cadre, to keep order among his men and to hold out until help came from Kajoe-Lē — although the many wounded made this ever harder.
The alarm had been carried to Kajoe-Lē by Second Lieutenant of Infantry H. Willink Ketjen, who, followed only by a mounted orderly, had forced a way through the enemy line. When the enemy saw the relieving company of infantry coming up in the direction of Tjot Bēhēl, he made a retreating movement on that side and his dangerous pressure on Buijs’ troop was stopped. The help came only just in time: the detachment’s situation had become critical. Dutch losses were 1 native fusilier killed and 19 men wounded, including 5 seriously, besides 6 artillery horses, of which 2 had to be destroyed.
Consequences
After this attack Major Mekern judged himself no longer strong enough both to hold Kajoe-Lē and to secure the communication with the other posts; the connection was, in fact, already cut. The news could not safely be carried by an armed escort — that would only invite a second attack — so in the early morning of 6 March two volunteers, the Bugis artillery-rider Mali and the forced-labourer Mohamad Daëng Matali, slipped through the enemy and brought Mekern’s report to the chief of staff at Kota Radja. The relief that followed brought about the storming of the enemy fortification at Lambaroe on 7 March.
Assessment
Meijer recorded the action as one of the most striking examples of the enemy’s boldness in this period: an attack in front and on both flanks, in a narrow passage, by a force greatly superior in numbers, against trained infantry with artillery — and nearly successful. Only the discipline kept by Buijs and the daring of Willink Ketjen prevented a second Atoeh catastrophe.
See Also
- T. W. J. Buijs
- H. Willink Ketjen
- Majoor B. E. Mekern
- Storming of Lambaroe (7 March 1876)
- Bugis couriers from Kajoe-Lē (6 March 1876)
- Lamsajoen
- Lambaroe
- Kajoe-Lē
- Guerilla warfare in Groot-Atjeh
Source
Atjeh van 26 December 1875 tot 4 September 1876, door H. F. Meijer (Breda: P. B. Nieuwenhuijs, 1883), chapter VI, pp. 120–122.