The Koloniaal Wereldepot (literally “Colonial World Depot,” more properly werfdepot or recruitment depot) at Harderwijk was the central Dutch military depot through which, at the time of the Atjeh War, all volunteers for the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger) recruited in the Netherlands were processed, given preliminary training and equipment, and then sent overseas to Batavia.

System Described by Brooshooft

In his Brooshooft (1886), Brooshooft described the working of the depot as part of his explanation of how the Indies army was raised and reinforced for the second Aceh expedition. He reported that, until the time of writing, the entire Indies army was recruited from volunteers — the Dutch Constitution forbade sending miliciens (conscripts) to the colonies against their will, although constitutional revision proposals were pending in 1886 to allow a portion of Dutch conscripts to be sent to the Indies in time of need. Marines (drawn by lot for sea service, as well as volunteers) could already be sent and were in fact used ashore during both the first and the second Aceh expeditions.

Recruitment of soldiers for the Indies army took place:

  • Partly in the Indies themselves, where the recruits were almost all Indonesians — Javanese, Ambonezen, Bugis and Alfoeren from Celebes and the Moluccas — with trusted non-commissioned officers being sent out to recruit and anyone bringing in a recruit receiving an aanbrenggeld (bringing-money), while the recruit himself received a handgeld (bounty). In time of need, such as during the Aceh War and the concurrent beri-beri epidemic, bounties were raised and extraordinary measures taken; Brooshooft cites a recent telegram announcing temporary emergency measures to recruit 1,500 men.
  • Partly in the Netherlands and other European states (mainly Belgium, France and Germany). The Dutch portion of this recruitment was centred on the Koloniaal Wereldepot at Harderwijk, with its barracks and other military facilities, where candidates were sent for preliminary training, outfitting, etc.

The Ronselaars

Brooshooft paints an unflattering picture of the Dutch end of the system. Recruits, he writes, were either:

  • soldiers, corporals and NCOs from the Dutch home army who “re-signed for the East” (overteekenen voor den Oost);
  • former Indies soldiers re-enlisting;
  • polderjongens (polder labourers), unemployed and other civilians.

The trade was largely in the hands of professional recruiters, popularly known as ronselaars or zielverkoopers (“soul-sellers”), who made it their regular business:

“Zekere personen, ronselaars of zielverkoopers bijgenaamd, maken daarvan hun bepaald beroep, halen de liefhebbers veelal door schoone voorspiegelingen tot dienstneming over, geven hun voorschotten op hun handgeld, om oude schulden af te doen of jenever te koopen, brengen hen naar Harderwijk, laten hen daar teekenen en kloppen hun dan, in trouwe samenwerking met kroegbazen en slaapsteehouders, onder allerlei voorwendsels, zooals het in orde brengen hunner papieren enz., nog zooveel mogelijk van [hun geld] uit den zak.”

These agents kept the aanbrenggeld (bringing fee) for themselves, while the recruit’s bounty was whittled away by advances, drinks and fees before embarkation; the newly enlisted man received his “boulje” (a vulgarisation of biljet, the enlistment ticket) from the recruiter. Most recruits were country boys from the back parts of Overijssel and other provinces who had seen little of the world; Brooshooft relates the anecdote of one such recruit marching to the steamer who asked the sergeant “hoe laat omtrent benne we daer nou, serzant?” (“about what time shall we be there now, sergeant?”), and on being asked where “there” was, replied “wel te Atjie” (“why, Atjeh”), to the general laughter of his comrades.

Standards and Quality

Despite the rough-and-ready recruiting system, Brooshooft argued that once in the Indies and under good officers, the bulk of European soldiers — whether Dutch or foreign — showed good soldierly qualities and, combined with the excellent quality of the officer corps, had earned the Indies army a well-deserved honourable reputation. French recruits, however, were “generally not among the best.” He regretted that too few adventurous Dutch boys volunteered for Indies service, which forced the army to rely on foreign elements that did little for the national character of the institution, but blamed this on the miserly rewards offered by the government — for example, a pension of only 200 guilders a year (about 55 cents a day) after twelve years of faithful service in the exhausting climate.

Later History

The Harderwijk depot remained the principal European gateway to the Indies army until the dissolution of the KNIL in 1950. Constitutional reform did eventually allow the sending of conscripts to the colonies, but in practice the KNIL remained a long-service volunteer force throughout the Aceh War.

See Also

Source

Brooshooft, Mr. P. Geschiedenis van den Atjeh-oorlog 1873–1886. Utrecht: F. B. van Ditmar, 1886, Hoofdstuk V (“Onze vestiging in Atjeh”), pp. 67–70 (pp. 79–82 of the OCR).